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 “Unfair or Unconscionable”: 
A New Approach to Time-Barred Debt 
Collection under the FDCPA 
Jon D. Fish† 
Since the 1990s, the trade in second-hand debt has exploded. Debt collectors 
now relentlessly pursue decades-old debts, purchased for pennies on the dollar from 
primary creditors. To avoid the bar that statutes of limitations place on judicial en-
forcement of these debts, third-party debt collectors seek “acknowledgment” from un-
witting consumers, which resets the limitations periods under state law. Under the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), federal courts have struggled to deal 
with these attempts at resetting the statutes of limitations—a practice that often feels 
inherently unfair. So far, courts have focused on whether collection attempts have 
violated the FDCPA’s ban on misrepresenting the legal status of a debt. But this 
Comment argues that courts should refocus their energies on the FDCPA’s prohibi-
tion against “unfair or unconscionable” collection practices. 
Under this new approach, courts are justified in classifying all attempts at 
collecting revivable time-barred debts as unconscionable. Not only does the extension 
of the FDCPA to these tactics follow from congressional intent, but it also reflects the 
meaning of unconscionability under contract law. When the revival of time-barred 
debts is viewed as a quasi-contractual interaction, it meets the definition of common 
law unconscionability: by violating the public policy of the FDCPA and statutes of 
limitations; by unfairly disadvantaging consumers due to informational asymmetry 
and unequal bargaining power; and by giving a windfall to debt collectors but es-
sentially no benefit to consumers, representing a total failure of consideration. This 
per se ban on the collection of revivable time-barred debts will also generate greater 
uniformity in consumer protection law and limit the substantial discretion currently 
available to courts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In search of an accessible epithet, newspapers across the 
country have christened debt that is barred by the statute of lim-
itations “zombie debt.”1 This “funny term”2 for time-barred debt 
reflects its tendency to come back to life and attack when, like the 
first victims in a horror movie, consumers “seal their [ ] fate” by 
their own heedless approaches to debt collectors.3 Consumer pro-
tection webpages seeking to arm readers against invasion warn 
of debt “that rises from the grave to ingest the bank accounts of 
the living.”4 Stock photos of bodiless arms in B-movie makeup, 
poking grimly from the ground, accompany lists of methods to 
“[f]ight back” against an undead scourge.5 And although burdened 
with bad metaphors, these articles provide useful tips to keep con-
sumers from falling victim to debt collectors’ tricks to reset stat-
utes of limitations and revive time-barred debts.6 Some articles 
even provide lists of illegal tactics that debt collectors commonly 
 
 1 See, for example, Laura Adams, How to Protect Yourself from ‘Zombie Debt’ Col-
lectors (US News, Oct 15, 2018), online at http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my 
-money/articles/2018-10-15/how-to-protect-yourself-from-zombie-debt-collectors (visited 
Jan 10, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable); Sean Pyles, 1 Wrong Move Can Bring ‘Zombie’ 
Debt Back from the Grave (USA Today, Oct 31, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9RGL 
-PHC4; Zombie Debt 101 (MoneyTips, Oct 18, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/2UYJ 
-3FXF; Kathy Kristof, 5 States with the Most “Zombie Debt” Complaints (CBS News, Mar 
7, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7WFP-FVSR. 
 2 Adams, How to Protect Yourself (cited in note 1). 
 3 Zombie Debt 101 (cited in note 1). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Pyles, 1 Wrong Move (cited in note 1). See also, for example, Zombie Debt 101 (cited 
in note 1); Adams, How to Protect Yourself (cited in note 1). 
 6 See Adams, How to Protect Yourself (cited in note 1). 
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deploy so that consumers can identify when a collector has 
crossed a line.7 Indeed, the number of consumer protection arti-
cles on time-barred debt is exceeded only by the variety of zombie 
puns that editors can tolerate. 
Such melodramatic descriptions are not the exclusive product 
of popular media. In fact, several scholarly articles unabashedly 
employ the same undead metaphor.8 One article even takes this 
metaphor a step further by comparing the revival of time-barred 
debts to a metastatic cancer that only a Chapter 7 lumpectomy 
can effectively kill.9 The fact that this grim wordplay, ranging 
from creative to cringeworthy,10 can appeal to such a wide variety 
of authors and audiences signals a deeper social aversion to the 
debt collection practice at issue. The pervasiveness of compari-
sons between time-barred debt collection and undead horrors ul-
timately raises the question of why the practice remains such a 
vibrant industry,11 free from much substantive regulation.12 Why 
do consumer protection blogs continue to battle these undead 
debts forty years after Congress purported to eliminate “abusive, 
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” with the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act13 (FDCPA)? Why have courts used the 
FDCPA as a mere linguistic tool to root out impermissible 
 
 7 See Susannah Snider, Know Your Rights When You’re on the Phone with a Debt 
Collector (US News, Mar 2, 2017), online at http://money.usnews.com/money/personal 
-finance/debt/articles/2017-03-02/know-your-rights-when-youre-on-the-phone-with-a-debt 
-collector (visited Jan 10, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 8 See, for example, Young Walgenkim, Killing “Zombie Debt” through Clarity and 
Consistency in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 24 Loyola Consumer L Rev 65, 65 
(2011); Judith Fox, Rush to Judgment: How the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Fails to 
Protect Consumers in Judicial Debt Collection, 13 Fla St U Bus Rev 37, 42 n 28 (2014); 
Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 NM L Rev 327, 328–
33 (2014); April Kuehnhoff and Margot Saunders, Zombie Debt: What the CFPB Should 
Do about Attempts to Collect Old Debt *2 (National Consumer Law Center, Jan 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9SEC-JMRV. 
 9 See Dalie Jimenez, Ending Perpetual Debts, 55 Houston L Rev 609, 617–18 (2018). 
 10 To avoid performing a resurrection ritual of my own, I have refrained from naming 
this Comment and its headings per the Romero-esque conventions of previous scholars. 
 11 “The [debt collection] industry is expected to exceed $500 billion in collections . . . 
in the United States over the next ten years.” Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 336 (cited in note 8). 
The third-party debt-buying industry is among “the fastest-growing sectors of all financial 
services.” Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: 
Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J Bus & Tech L 259, 265 (2011). 
 12 “The majority of the statutes and rules [regulating debt collection] are not de-
signed to directly change lending practices, but, rather, are designed to force lenders to 
disclose the nature, extent, cost, source, and other factors regarding credit, credit-like, and 
credit-affecting arrangements.” R. Glen Ayers Jr, Beyond Truth-in-Lending—Federal Reg-
ulation of Debt Collection, 16 St Mary’s L J 329, 331 (1985). 
 13 Pub L No 90-321, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1692. 
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“threats” when it actually provides a substantive framework to 
tackle the problem of time-barred debts at its source? 
The answers to these questions are not so simple. Histori-
cally, widespread attempts to collect on time-barred debts did not 
arise until primary creditors first began charging off14 old debts 
in bulk during the late 1980s,15 years after the passage of the 
FDCPA. Unsurprisingly, Congress, while deserving praise for its 
bipartisan attempt to rein in abusive debt collectors, proved hope-
lessly reactive in passing the FDCPA.16 By focusing mainly on 
remedying previous abuses by primary creditors,17 Congress 
failed to predict the explosive expansion of a secondhand market 
for consumer debts18 and how this market would seek to avail it-
self of laws in the majority of states to reset the statute of  
limitations.19 
Today, an inert Congress continues to refrain from amending 
or expanding the reach of the FDCPA, even as time-barred debt 
collection poses an ever-expanding threat to consumers.20 Mean-
while, judges continue to rely on a patchwork reading of the 
FDCPA’s prohibition on misrepresentation, codified in 15 USC 
§ 1692e, which has created a nonuniform field of law with plenty 
of loopholes for unscrupulous collectors to abuse. Yet, the FDCPA 
remains the most viable statutory basis for reining in the abuses 
associated with time-barred debt collection. This Comment posits 
that the best remedy to time-barred debt collection abuses lies in 
 
 14 “Charged off” is an industry term for debt that a creditor has taken off a balance 
sheet because it seems unlikely to be collected. See, for example, Lauren Goldberg, Dealing 
in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection after FDCPA, 79 S Cal L Rev 711, 725–
27 (2006). See also Julia Kagan, Charge-Off (Investopedia, Jan 31, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/33L7-FGLX. 
 15 See Goldberg, 79 S Cal L Rev at 725 (cited in note 14) (noting that, in response to 
economic troubles in the 1980s, the FDIC began selling the debts of failing banks and 
Bank of America began selling old credit card debt). 
 16 See id at 718 (arguing that “with [the] FDCPA, Congress created a law intended 
only to remedy previous abusive behavior and not to prospectively adapt to a changing 
industry”). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 334–35 (cited in note 8) (“The [debt-buying] industry 
has emerged as one of ‘the fastest-growing sectors of all financial services.’ . . . From 1993 
to 2005 the amount of purchased debt rose nearly twenty-fold, from $6 billion to over $110 
billion.”). 
 19 See note 37 and accompanying text. 
 20 According to the CFPB’s database, complaints that collectors were seeking to re-
cover debts that were either inflated or not owed as a percentage of overall complaints 
increased from approximately 30 percent in 2010 to nearly 40 percent in 2011. See Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Re-
port 2012 *8, archived at http://perma.cc/UU7A-WLGL. 
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a new approach under a different statutory provision: namely, 15 
USC § 1692f, the FDCPA’s prohibition on “unfair or unconscionable” 
debt collection practices.21 
While courts have limited the usefulness of § 1692e to time-
barred debtor-litigants, they have left § 1692f largely untouched 
in this context. This Comment proposes that courts should clas-
sify all attempts to collect time-barred debts as “unconscionable” 
under § 1692f in states where resetting the statute of limitations 
is possible. This jurisprudential maneuver would ensure that 
statutes of limitations protect consumer debtors while encourag-
ing primary creditors and downstream debt buyers to employ 
more honest collection practices. 
To support such an approach, this Comment proceeds in 
three parts. Part I explains the history of time-barred debt collec-
tion, the reasons why time-barred debt collection presents unique 
difficulties for consumers and courts, and the background of the 
FDCPA. Part II takes a nuanced look at courts’ current ap-
proaches to time-barred debt collection, including the two pri-
mary approaches under 15 USC § 1692e, as well as a critical sum-
mary of litigants’ past attempts to challenge time-barred debt 
collection under 15 USC § 1692f. Finally, Part III presents a com-
prehensive analysis of time-barred debt collection under 15 USC 
§ 1692f that goes beyond the unimaginative interpretations that 
courts have previously undertaken. By addressing the theoretical 
as well as the normative justifications for classifying all time-
barred debt collection as an “unfair or unconscionable” practice, 
Part III offers a legal basis for courts to fault any attempt to seek 
repayment of these (un)dead debts. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF TIME-BARRED DEBT COLLECTION AND THE 
FDCPA 
Before delving into current judicial approaches to time-
barred debt collection, it is important to understand why consum-
ers struggle with time-barred debt collection and why the FDCPA 
is the most protective shield against debt collector mischief. As 
this Part outlines, the collection of time-barred debt presents 
unique harms to consumers that warrant a judicial response. Fur-
thermore, this Part demonstrates that Congress intended the 
FDCPA to apply to a wide variety of problematic debt collection 
 
 21 15 USC § 1692f. 
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tactics, even though it did not specifically contemplate the prob-
lems of time-barred debt collection when passing the Act in 1977. 
A. The Problem of Time-Barred Debt Collection 
Scholars have diligently documented the harmful and perva-
sive impact that time-barred debt collection has on consumers at 
the hands of a voracious debt collection industry.22 Since the debt-
buying industry’s boom in the early 1990s, third-party debt col-
lectors have dominated the debt collection arena.23 Primary cred-
itors, wishing to avoid an unfamiliar debt-collecting industry and 
seeking to maintain good relations with their customers, have un-
loaded debts for pennies on the dollar to professional collections 
agencies.24 Unburdened by the reputational restraints of repeat 
play, these collections agencies can try any trick or tactic plausi-
bly allowed under the law.25 One of these agencies’ “insidious tac-
tics” involves inducing consumers to revive time-barred debts—
causing a legally unenforceable debt to become enforceable once 
more, despite the initial statute of limitations running its 
course.26 Once a consumer inadvertently revives his or her debt, 
debt collectors can pursue a low-cost and often uncontested law-
suit to turn a profit on the underlying debt.27 The ability of debt 
 
 22 For example, “25 percent of all complaints received by the FTC relate to the debt-
collection industry.” Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 337 (cited in note 8). Moreover, “[i]n 2013, the 
top complaint against debt collectors (one-third of the total received) concerned attempts 
to recover debts that were not owed”—which includes those debts barred by the statute of 
limitations. Id at 338 n 70. “Fourteen percent of Americans—nearly thirty million individ-
uals—receive [collections] calls.” Id at 334. And as to suits filed on time-barred debt, one 
legal services provider in New York “claims that more than half of the actions in its office 
were based on time-barred debt.” Id at 346 n 129. Once obtained, “court judgments from 
collection suits can be near-permanent” and can lead to wage garnishment, frozen bank 
accounts, seizure of assets, reporting to credit reporting agencies, and in rare cases, arrest 
of the debtor. Lisa Stifler, Debt in the Courts: The Scourge of Abusive Debt Collection Liti-
gation and Possible Policy Solutions, 11 Harv L & Pol Rev 91, 99–100 (2017) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 23 “In 1996, only about a dozen debt-buying firms existed. Currently, over 500 pri-
vately owned companies, as well as at least four publicly traded companies, are debt buy-
ers.” Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 335 (citations omitted) (cited in note 8). 
 24 See id at 331. 
 25 Id at 331, 360. 
 26 See Goldberg, 79 S Cal L Rev at 729 (cited in note 14). Debt collectors’ other de-
ceptive strategies include: the evasion of US law by outsourcing collections to foreign coun-
tries, the use of demographics to target vulnerable consumers, and the exploitation of 
small-claims courts. 
 27 The Federal Trade Commission has found that “90% or more of consumers sued in 
[debt collection] actions do not appear in court to defend.” Federal Trade Commission, The 
Structure and Practices of the Debt-Buying Industry *45 (Jan 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/45NB-ZTDC. 
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collectors to engage in such tactics is magnified by consumers’ 
near-universal undereducation regarding the complex laws of 
debt collection and statutes of limitations.28 
An astounding lack of information on the part of debt collec-
tors presents a pressing threshold problem. In a study by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), the consumer’s date of default—
which is used to calculate the beginning of the limitations period 
in most cases—was actually missing from 65 percent of accounts 
purchased by debt collectors.29 Likewise, consumers often lack 
documentary evidence of the date of default for very old debts.30 
However, consumers may not realize that debt collectors often 
lack this information as well; they are willing to trust that a col-
lector would not pursue a debt unless the collector had the legal 
evidence to back up the debt’s validity.31 Consumer trust allows 
debt collectors to pursue legally dubious debts without restraint. 
Even when debt collectors do possess information on the timeli-
ness of a debt, the narrow haven that the statute of limitations 
provides does little to deter collections actions. 
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 
in most states,32 most federal jurisdictions have held that filing 
suit on a time-barred debt is a per se violation of the FDCPA—
either § 1692e, § 1692f, or both.33 Given that consumer- 
defendants are the only party with standing to challenge time-
barred suits, however, the federal per se rule provides little con-
solation. The vast majority of these debt collection suits result in 
default judgments; the few consumers who appear to defend 
themselves often do so pro se.34 Without the advice of an attorney, 
these consumers are unlikely to know that an affirmative  
 
 28 See Federal Trade Commission, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers 
in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration *26 (July 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LL5C-GEUJ. 
 29 See Federal Trade Commission, Debt-Buying Industry at *34–35 (cited in note 27). 
The only information consistently included with these sold accounts is: the debtor’s out-
standing balance (100 percent); the debtor’s name, street address, and Social Security 
number (98 percent); the date the debtor opened the account (97 percent); and the date 
the debtor made his or her last payment (90 percent). See id. 
 30 See Dalie Jimenez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 Harv J Legis 41, 112 (2015) 
(arguing that it is unreasonable to expect consumers to retain documentation of account 
records over such long periods of time). 
 31 See id at 115. 
 32 See Federal Trade Commission, Debt-Buying Industry at *45 (cited in note 27). 
 33 See Ramirez v Palisades Collection LLC, 250 FRD 366, 369 (ND Ill 2008) (collect-
ing cases). 
 34 See Stifler, 11 Harv L & Pol Rev at 115 (cited in note 22) (noting that “only one to 
ten percent of consumer defendants retain representation in debt collection cases”). 
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statute-of-limitations defense exists or that the FDCPA may bar 
the suit. And like all affirmative defenses, the statute of limita-
tions can be waived.35 Even if the consumer later discovers that 
the limitations period has run, the consumer’s only recourse 
would be to bring a new, separate suit against the debt collector 
to recover damages for filing the time-barred suit in violation of 
the FDCPA. Federal courts lack the power to overturn the original 
judgment, which may very likely be in excess of the maximum of 
$1,000 in statutory damages allowed in a successful FDCPA suit.36 
Even more problematic than consumers’ difficulty in bringing 
a statute-of-limitations defense is the limited reach and durabil-
ity of the defense itself. In all but two states—Wisconsin and  
Mississippi—the statute of limitations never extinguishes a debt; 
it only limits the debt collector’s ability to sue for repayment in a 
court of law.37 Because the debt is still considered legally valid, 
debt collectors are permitted by state law to ask for voluntary re-
payment outside of a court setting.38 Moreover, the vast majority 
of states allow resurrection of time-barred debts by the consumer, 
which may extinguish the limitations defense altogether.39 Gen-
erally, reviving a debt requires the debtor to make some affirma-
tive acknowledgment that she owes the debt. But some states 
have established a very low bar for what this acknowledgment 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 The FDCPA only gives federal courts the power to award damages, not to provide 
equitable relief or overturn suits at state law. See Weiss v Regal Collections, 385 F3d 337, 
342 (3d Cir 2004) (“[W]e hold injunctive and declaratory relief are not available to litigants 
acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA.”). The FDCPA also does not provide a 
disgorgement remedy for debts that consumers have paid solely as a result of being tar-
geted by a prohibited debt collection practice. See Palmer v Stassinos, 348 F Supp 2d 1070, 
1088 (ND Cal 2004). As an example of this in practice, in McCollough v Johnson,  
Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F3d 939 (9th Cir 2011), a debt collector filed suit on a 
time-barred debt with a principal balance of $3,816.80 and interest of $5,536.81. After 
successfully countersuing, the consumer received the maximum $1,000 damages allowed 
under the FDCPA. The plaintiff’s much larger tort recovery ultimately came from a state 
law malicious prosecution claim, rather than from the FDCPA claim. 
 37 See generally Thomas R. Dominczyk, Time-Barred Debt: Is It Now Uncollectable?, 
33 Bank & Fin Serv Pol Rep 13 (2014) (explaining that, in most states, a creditor can win 
a judgment on a debt even after the statute of limitations has run if the debtor does not 
raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense). 
 38 See, for example, Pantoja v Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 852 F3d 679, 685 
(7th Cir 2017) (noting that “[t]he creditor retains the legal right to appeal to the debtor to 
honor the debt out of a sense of moral obligation even if the legal obligation can no longer 
be enforced in court”). 
 39 See Stifler, 11 Harv L & Pol Rev at 103 (cited in note 22). 
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requires.40 In most states, an act of partial payment will cause a 
revival of the entire debt’s enforceability.41 Even more dangerous 
is that written acknowledgment—sometimes by simply signing a 
form provided by the debt collector—revives a debt’s statute of 
limitations in some jurisdictions.42 Once a debt is revived, debt 
collectors may immediately seek judicial enforcement of the debt 
under state law. As the law stands, debt collectors have no affirm-
ative duty to warn consumers that their debts could possibly re-
vive, and consumers themselves almost universally lack an un-
derstanding of this counterintuitive area of law.43 
In essence, acknowledgement of a stale debt constitutes an 
active waiver of the statute of limitations by the consumer, reset-
ting the limitations period. Because it deprives consumers of a 
legal defense unknown to them, acknowledging time-barred debts 
can wreak substantial harm on consumers long after they have 
incurred them. The possibility of revival makes the problem of 
time-barred debt collection especially open to abuse, and thus es-
pecially deserving of remedy under the FDCPA. 
B. The Contours of the FDCPA 
The FDCPA targets a wide variety of abusive collections prac-
tices. It prohibits debt collectors from disclosing consumers’ debt 
collection information to third parties44 and harassing consumers 
to collect a debt,45 and it also prohibits third parties from furnish-
ing deceptive forms for debt collectors to use.46 It further limits 
the time and place where debt collectors may contact consumers47 
and establishes a mechanism that consumers can use to request 
documentation to “validate” the debts they have allegedly failed 
 
 40 See Steve Sukert, Note, Disclosure as a Shield against Unethical Collectors That 
Doesn’t Weigh Down the Consumer Debtor, 30 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 1015, 1024–25 
(2017). See also Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 349 (cited in note 8). The debt collection industry 
tellingly refers to the practice of inducing consumers to revive time-barred debts as “dup-
ing.” See id at 349 n 155. 
 41 Sukert, Note, 30 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 1024 (cited in note 40). 
 42 Id at 1025. 
 43 See id at 1032. See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Outline of Pro-
posals under Consideration and Alternatives Considered *19 (July 28, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4FHF-A5JL (finding via consumer testing that “[c]oncepts related to stat-
utes of limitations are challenging for consumers to understand, especially the fact that in 
some jurisdictions consumers may ‘revive’ a debt”). 
 44 15 USC § 1692c(b). 
 45 15 USC § 1692d. 
 46 15 USC § 1692j. 
 47 15 USC § 1692c(a). 
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to honor.48 For the purposes of this Comment, however, the most 
relevant sections of the FDCPA are § 1692e and § 1692f. The tra-
ditional home for claims against time-barred debt collection is 
§ 1692e, which prohibits the use of “false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of any 
debt.”49 Conversely, § 1692f offers a much more nebulous prohibi-
tion against using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt.”50 Both § 1692e and § 1692f also con-
tain a list of practices that constitute per se violations of their 
overarching prohibitions.51 Neither the list in § 1692e nor the list 
in § 1692f explicitly mentions collection attempts on time-barred 
debt or other conduct that induces the revival of debts under  
state law. 
The FDCPA also provides for legal remedies against debt col-
lectors who violate the Act’s prohibitions. Section 1692k allows 
for the recovery of actual damages for violations of the FDCPA’s 
several provisions plus the recovery of “additional damages” as a 
court may award.52 Because the practices the FDCPA prohibits do 
not lend themselves to the evidence and calculation of “actual” 
damages,53 litigants may often find the lion’s share of their com-
pensation under § 1692k’s allowance for statutory damages. 
These statutory damages, however, remain capped at $1,000—a 
sum diluted by inflation, having remained the same since the 
act’s initial passage in 1977.54 Indeed, because of the low- 
compensation remedies of the FDCPA, the statute works best as 
a deterrent to bad debt collection practices ex ante by threatening 
debt collectors with litigation costs and potentially numerous but 
 
 48 15 USC § 1692g. 
 49 15 USC § 1692e. 
 50 15 USC § 1692f. 
 51 See 15 USC § 1692e(1)–(16); 15 USC § 1692f(1)–(8). Examples of these per se ille-
gal practices include: implying that an individual is an attorney when they are not, imply-
ing that failure to pay a debt will result in imprisonment, using an alias business name, 
and falsely representing that a collector works for a consumer reporting agency. See also 
note 123 and accompanying text for per se unlawful practices under § 1692f. 
 52 15 USC § 1692k(a). 
 53 See Baker v G. C. Services Corp, 677 F2d 775, 780 (9th Cir 1982) (observing that 
“[t]he only actual damages that a plaintiff would be likely to incur [from an FDCPA viola-
tion] would be for emotional distress caused by abusive debt collection practices and, un-
less the violations are extreme and outrageous, traditional stringent evidentiary hurdles 
would be difficult to overcome”). 
 54 See 15 USC § 1692k(a). 
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small damages awards.55 It does little to console the victims of 
debt collection abuses after the fact. 
Further bolstering the FDCPA’s deterrent effect are the al-
ternatives to private enforcement embedded in its statutory 
scheme. Although private rights of action and class actions are 
two principal mechanisms of FDCPA enforcement, two federal 
agencies—the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—are endowed with 
regulatory powers under the statute. Section 1692l gives the FTC 
broad power to enforce a violation of the FDCPA as “an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice in violation of [the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act].”56 Additionally, the CFPB has the authority to “pre-
scribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collec-
tors”; indeed, the CFPB’s rulemaking authority extends to all 
agencies given incidental enforcement powers under the statute, 
including the FTC.57 Concomitant with its power to issue rules, 
the CFPB is required under the FDCPA to report its activities to 
Congress.58 There is evidence that the CFPB and FTC have taken 
their grant of authority seriously in the past, including with mat-
ters related to the collection of time-barred debts.59 Indeed, some 
commentators have suggested that regulatory action is a promis-
ing solution to the problem of time-barred debt collection.60 Nev-
ertheless, given the decades that administrative agencies have 
had to deal with these problems and the continued scourge of 
 
 55 Individual suits are unlikely to have a deterrent effect either, given the relative 
tininess of the $1,000 damages cap. Class actions are more likely to deter bad collection 
practices given a much higher cap on damages for the class, but at least one author thinks 
that the $500,000 cap for class actions is unlikely to deter the “multi-billion dollar” jug-
gernaut that is the debt-buying industry. See Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 367 (cited in note 8). 
 56 15 USC § 1692l(a). 
 57 15 USC § 1692l(d). 
 58 See 15 USC § 1692m. 
 59 See, for example, Jimenez, 52 Harv J Legis at 84 n 170 (cited in note 30) (providing 
a long list of instances from 2013 and 2014 in which the FTC sued or shut down debt 
collectors). 
 60 This solution has also been considered by the CFPB. See Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau, Proposals under Consideration at *21 (cited in note 43). In addition to the 
inherent difficulties in prescribing solutions at the regulatory level—particularly the like-
lihood that deregulatory presidential administrations will rescind rules as soon as they 
come to power—there is also evidence that undermines the purported efficacy of the  
disclosure-based approaches to this issue taken by the FTC and CFPB. See Sukert, Note, 
30 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 1032–36 (cited in note 40). Thus, the self-reinforcing 
nature of a judicial solution, as proposed by this Comment, will likely prove more lasting 
than any action by an administrative agency. 
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time-barred debt collection for consumers, this Comment con-
tends that regulatory action alone is insufficient to resolve this 
problem. 
As one may expect, the enumerated debt collection practices 
that the FDCPA prohibits do not tell the whole story. The prover-
bial Holmesian “bad man”61 will inevitably devise techniques to 
escape the reach of the law. Catchall provisions allow courts some 
discretion to root out bad practices that the legislature failed to 
predict. Although courts may not always enthusiastically accept 
this delegation of legislative power,62 the FDCPA contains an ap-
parent catchall provision in the introductory clauses of §§ 1692d, 
1692e, and 1692f. In suggesting that the FDCPA embraced room 
for judicial interpretation, the Senate’s Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs Committee noted: “In addition to these specific pro-
hibitions, this bill prohibits in general terms any harassing, un-
fair, or deceptive collection practice. This will enable the courts, 
where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is 
not specifically addressed.”63 
Courts have generally agreed with this statement of legisla-
tive intent in their rulings. The district court in Tsenes v Trans-
Continental Credit & Collection Corp64 explained that the subsec-
tions are all introduced with the phrase: “Without limiting the 
general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a vi-
olation of this section.”65 Consequently, “[t]he list of [ ] violations 
found in the [FDCPA’s] subsections are nonexhaustive” and it is 
thus correct to conclude that the “prefatory language [alone] pro-
vides a cause of action.”66 With this in mind, courts should not feel 
limited by the lists of practices the FDCPA explicitly prohibits. Ra-
ther, any assessment of unconscionability under § 1692f should 
originate from an examination of first principles, including judicial 
decisions, legislative intent, and the common law of contracts.67 
 
 61 See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897). 
Justice Holmes’s “bad man” “cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge [of the law] enables him to predict.” Id. “[A] man tough enough to pay the price 
always has the option of noncompliance with the law’s directives.” Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 49 Fla L Rev 
353, 412 (1997). 
 62 See notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 63 S Rep No 95-382, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1977). 
 64 892 F Supp 461 (EDNY 1995). 
 65 Id at 466. 
 66 Id. 
 67 For a discussion of what these first principles of unconscionability include, see 
Part III.A. 
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II.  CURRENT APPROACH TO TIME-BARRED DEBT COLLECTION 
Federal courts have not yet tackled the expansion of § 1692e 
jurisprudence that I urge. Nevertheless, given the pernicious ef-
fects that time-barred debt collection has on consumers,68 it 
should come as no surprise that these debt collection practices 
have already been litigated in federal courts across the country. 
As a result, courts have developed various judicial approaches to 
time-barred debt suits under the FDCPA. The Eighth Circuit  
decision in Freyermuth v Credit Bureau Services, Inc69 and the  
Seventh Circuit decision in McMahon v LVNV Funding, LLC70 
typify the prevailing approaches to time-barred debt collection 
taken by the federal courts. These decisions provide the “threat-
of-litigation” test71 and a misrepresentation standard,72 respec-
tively, under § 1692e. Currently, only the Eighth Circuit em-
braces the threat-of-litigation test developed in Freyermuth. The 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits embrace some form of 
the misrepresentation standard. The remaining circuits have yet 
to contend with this issue. In addition to these two tests, which 
stand opposite one another in a circuit split based on conflicting 
interpretations of § 1692e,73 some courts and commentators have 
advocated for mandatory disclosures and regulatory intervention 
to address the abuses of time-barred debt collection.74 
This Part addresses these two approaches to time-barred 
debt collection in turn, presenting arguments as to their  
 
 68 See Part I.A. 
 69 248 F3d 767 (8th Cir 2001). 
 70 744 F3d 1010 (7th Cir 2014). 
 71 See Part II.A. 
 72 See Part II.B. 
 73 The court in McMahon, the first to differ from the approach in Freyermuth, con-
sciously recognized its creation of a circuit split. See McMahon, 744 F3d at 1020 & n 1; 
Daugherty v Convergent Outsourcing, Inc, 836 F3d 507, 513 (5th Cir 2016) (“The Seventh 
Circuit specifically said its ‘opinion create[d] a conflict in the circuits.’”). However, at least 
one Court of Appeals disagrees with the proposition that McMahon and Freyermuth are 
in conflict. See Buchanan v Northland Group, Inc, 776 F3d 393, 399 (6th Cir 2015)  
(“Northland claims that this approach puts us at odds with two fellow circuits. No such 
conflict exists.”). This Comment assumes, as the majority of circuits do, that the circuit 
split exists. 
 74 See, for example, Sukert, Note, 30 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 1028–36 (cited in 
note 40) (advocating for the adoption of the itemized disclosures required by the CFPB’s 
proposed Regulation F); Consent Decree, United States v Asset Acceptance, LLC, No 8:12-
cv-182-T-27EAJ, *13 (MD Fla filed Jan 31, 2012) (mandating a disclosure that “[t]he law 
limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue 
you for it.”); Buchanan, 776 F3d at 399 (noting that “[w]ithout disclosure, a well-meaning 
debtor could inadvertently dig herself into an even deeper hole”). 
1954 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1941 
 
inefficiency and failure to adequately protect consumers. After 
critiquing the approaches courts have taken thus far under 
§ 1692e, this Part will examine the sparse analysis that courts 
have devoted to time-barred debt collection under § 1692f. As the 
following analysis demonstrates, the majority of courts have failed 
to adequately address § 1692f, specifically by latching onto a  
narrow reading of “unfair or unconscionable” that lacks either a 
statutory or common law basis. When courts give unconscionability 
its fair definition, the doctrine will permit 15 USC § 1692f to  
prohibit attempts to collect time-barred debts that are subject to 
revival under state law. 
A. The “Threat-of-Litigation” Test under § 1692e 
The first court of appeals to address time-barred debt collec-
tion under § 1692e also devised the least judicially popular ap-
proach to the issue. In Freyermuth, the Eighth Circuit developed 
a “threat-of-litigation” test that has only ever enjoyed express 
support by, at most, two circuits. That number has since dwindled 
to one following a reversal by the Third Circuit.75 Nevertheless, 
the Eighth Circuit has yet to question its own precedent in  
Freyermuth, and the test developed in that case continues to face 
discussion, often critical, from later courts and commentators.76 
Whether rightly or wrongly decided, the case is important for es-
tablishing a baseline for future FDCPA jurisprudence on time-
barred debt collection. Subsequent courts, when faced with this 
issue for the first time, often consider Freyermuth as one of only 
two possible paths to take. The current law accepts a dichotomous 
choice between Freyermuth’s threat-of-litigation test and 
McMahon’s misrepresentation standard. 
The threat-of-litigation test introduced by Freyermuth only 
finds a violation of § 1692e when a debt collector’s attempt to col-
lect a time-barred debt contains an “express threat of litigation” 
against the debtor.77 In essence, the Freyermuth decision takes a 
 
 75 The Third Circuit originally appeared to agree with the Freyermuth holding. See 
Huertas v Galaxy Asset Management, 641 F3d 28, 33 (3d Cir 2011) (noting that a plaintiff’s 
“FDCPA claim hinge[d] on whether [the defendant’s] letter threatened litigation”). It has 
since reversed course and endorsed the McMahon misrepresentation standard. See Tatis 
v Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F3d 422, 429 (3d Cir 2018) (agreeing with McMahon and its 
progeny that “construing the [FDCPA] to require a threat of legal action for any FDCPA 
violation interposes a mandate that is not found in its text”). 
 76 See, for example, Daugherty, 836 F3d at 513; Tatis, 882 F3d at 427; Carter v First 
National Collection Bureau, Inc, 135 F Supp 3d 565, 571–72 n 8 (SD Tex 2015). 
 77 See Freyermuth, 248 F3d at 771. 
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narrow view of § 1692e’s prohibitions against the “false represen-
tation of [ ] the character, amount, or legal status of any debt”78 
and the “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or 
that is not intended to be taken.”79 The Freyermuth court sur-
veyed the district court decisions that had interpreted the FDCPA 
with respect to time-barred debt, identifying only one court that 
had extended the holding in Kimber v Federal Financial Corp80 to 
a collection letter that did not threaten litigation.81 Moreover, the 
court endorsed the notion that “a statute of limitations does not 
eliminate the debt; it merely limits the judicial remedies availa-
ble.”82 The Freyermuth line of decisions has cited this narrow view 
of the statute of limitations as evidence that an attempt to induce 
a “voluntary” repayment of a time-barred debt is completely law-
ful.83 Only a threat to inappropriately involve the courts, the 
Freyermuth progeny has held, would rise to the level of false, de-
ceptive, or misleading representations. 
Notably, the court in Freyermuth performed no statutory in-
terpretation, merely citing the text of § 1692d–f without further 
discussion.84 This glossing over the statutory language in favor of 
deference to precedent is typical of the Freyermuth line of cases.85 
Their failure to critically engage the text lends credence to later 
courts’ criticism that the FDCPA “cannot bear the reading that 
[Freyermuth and its progeny] have given it,”86 specifically, that 
“construing the [FDCPA] to require a threat of legal action . . . 
 
 78 15 USC § 1692e(2)(A). 
 79 15 USC § 1692e(5). 
 80 668 F Supp 1480 (MD Ala 1987). Kimber was the first federal court decision to 
analyze the interplay between the FDCPA and time-barred debt collection, holding that 
15 USC § 1692e is violated when a debt collector threatens to sue on a debt that it knows 
to be time-barred. For Kimber’s less rigorous analysis of 15 USC § 1692f, see note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 81 See Freyermuth, 248 F3d at 771 (noting that “[o]nly one court has found a violation 
of the [FDCPA] in the absence of an express threat of litigation when a creditor attempts 
to collect on a time-barred debt”), citing Stepney v Outsourcing Solutions, Inc, 1997 WL 
722972 (ND Ill). 
 82 Freyermuth, 248 F3d at 771. 
 83 See Huertas, 641 F3d at 32–33; Walker v Cash Flow Consultants, Inc, 200 FRD 
613, 616 (ND Ill 2001). 
 84 See Freyermuth, 248 F3d at 771 (“Impermissible practices include harassing, op-
pressive or abusive conduct; false, deceptive or misleading representations; and unfair or 
unconscionable collection methods. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692d–f.”). 
 85 See, for example, Huertas, 641 F3d at 32–33 (“agree[ing] with the logic underlying” 
a long list of cases without analyzing the statutory language anew). 
 86 McMahon, 744 F3d at 1020. 
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interposes a mandate that is not found in its text.”87 Such a sub-
stantial lack of textual justification for the threat-of-litigation 
test would require significant counterbalancing policy justifica-
tions to sustain it as a valid approach. 
Unfortunately for the Eighth Circuit, not only does the 
threat-of-litigation test lack support from sister circuits and the 
statutory text, but normative and public policy reasons also do 
not justify the rule. It is true that the test provides an undeniably 
bright-line rule in proposing that, “in the absence of a threat of 
litigation or actual litigation, no violation of the FDCPA has oc-
curred when a debt collector attempts to collect on a potentially 
time-barred debt that is otherwise valid.”88 Such a rule provides 
clearer expectations for debt collectors and arguably reduces the 
amount of FDCPA litigation of time-barred debt collection—espe-
cially the fact-intensive litigation required under the alternative 
majority approach.89 Nevertheless, the rule falls victim to the 
common complaint of underinclusiveness. The threat-of-litigation 
test, rigidly followed, would allow a debt collector to frankly and 
inaccurately inform a consumer that a time-barred debt was en-
forceable in court as long as it did not threaten to act on that in-
formation.90 This result clearly contradicts the language of 
§ 1692e(2)(A), which bars “[t]he false representation of . . . [the] 
legal status of any debt.”91 
The threat-of-litigation test also ignores the broad grant of 
remedial authority inherent in the FDCPA by strictly declaring 
only a single action off-limits.92 The court in Freyermuth could not 
perfectly predict every tactic that debt collectors would use to re-
vive debts following the pronouncement of its test. Instead, it ar-
tificially limited courts’ ability to protect consumers while placing 
almost no restrictions on time-barred debt collection. In fact, the 
court’s decision arguably renders the FDCPA surplusage as to 
 
 87 Tatis, 882 F3d at 429. 
 88 Freyermuth, 248 F3d at 771. 
 89 See McMahon, 744 F3d at 1019–20, citing Evory v RJM Acquisitions Funding 
LLC, 505 F3d 769, 776 (7th Cir 2007) (“Whether a dunning letter is confusing is a question 
of fact. . . . We have therefore cautioned against reliance ‘on our intuitions.’”) (emphasis 
added). 
 90 See McMahon, 744 F3d at 1021 (rejecting the rigidity of the threat-of-litigation 
test by noting that “[i]f a debt collector stated that it could sue on a timebarred debt but 
was promising to forbear, that statement would be a false representation about the legal 
status of that debt” even though “no litigation was actually threatened”). 
 91 15 USC § 1692e(2). 
 92 See notes 130–31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FDCPA’s “broad 
remedial scope.” 
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some time-barred debt collection. The practices that the threat-
of-litigation test bars may have already been prohibited under 
some states’ laws.93 Moreover, the possibility of a mere $1,000 
statutory claim, less litigation expenses, hardly adds protection 
to the least sophisticated consumer who has just revived the  
enforceability of a thirty-year-old debt that may greatly exceed 
that $1,000 cap. It strains credulity to imagine that Congress 
wanted to leave a debt collection practice that has such obviously 
harmful effects on consumers largely untouched by the FDCPA. 
Any benefits to the speed and cost of the court system and pre-
dictability for litigants that the threat-of-litigation test may bring 
are necessarily outweighed by the free rein it gives to collectors of 
time-barred debts. 
B. The Misrepresentation Standard under § 1692e 
While the Eighth and Third Circuits had more or less coa-
lesced around the threat-of-litigation test, the Seventh Circuit 
took a decidedly different tack in McMahon. The court embraced 
a misrepresentation standard that faults any language that 
might conceivably mislead a consumer into thinking a debt is en-
forceable in court.94 Noting that “efforts to collect time-barred 
debts can violate the [FDCPA],”95 the Seventh Circuit’s holding 
relied on two principal facts of the McMahon case: the lack of lan-
guage in the dunning letter to the debtor indicating the “advanced 
age of the debt[s],” and the offer to “settle” the debts for a given 
price.96 The court also approvingly cited the FTC’s repudiation of 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Freyermuth and the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Huertas v Galaxy Asset Management.97 The dis-
trict courts noted, and the Seventh Circuit found persuasive, that 
the FTC has found that nondisclosure of the fact that a debt 
is time-barred might deceive a consumer in at least two ways: 
first, because most consumers do not know or understand 
 
 93 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Proposals under Consideration at *19 
(cited in note 43) (noting that “[i]n a few states, collectors are affirmatively prohibited from 
bringing suit on time-barred debt under state law”). 
 94 McMahon, 744 F3d at 1020. 
 95 Id (emphasis added), citing Phillips v Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F3d 1076, 1079 
(7th Cir 2013). 
 96 McMahon, 744 F3d at 1013. See also id at 1021 (“The fact that both [plaintiffs’] 
letters contained an offer of settlement makes things worse, not better.”). 
 97 641 F3d 28 (3d Cir 2011). See also Federal Trade Commission, The Structure and 
Practices of the Debt-Buying Industry at *47 (cited in note 27). 
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their legal rights with respect to the collection of time-barred 
debt, attempts to collect on such debt may create a mislead-
ing impression that the consumer has no defense to a lawsuit; 
and second, consumers often do not know that in many states 
the making of a partial payment on a stale debt actually re-
vives the entire debt even if it was otherwise time-barred.98 
The court went on to note that the FTC has recommended man-
datory disclosures to remedy the problems associated with the 
dunning of time-barred debt.99 While careful to caution that it is 
not “automatically improper for a debt collector to seek  
re-payment of time-barred debts” on the basis that some people 
consider it a “moral obligation” to pay them off fully,100 the 
McMahon court ultimately found against the debt collector in the 
case. It concluded that “if the debt collector uses language in its 
dunning letter that would mislead an unsophisticated consumer 
into believing that the debt is legally enforceable, regardless of 
whether the letter actually threatens litigation (the requirement 
the Third and Eighth Circuits added to the mix), the collector has 
violated the FDCPA.”101 Although the Seventh Circuit suggested 
that a violation was especially likely when “a letter . . . uses the 
term ‘settle’ or ‘settlement,’”102 the court did not offer any other 
insight on how to determine when a collection attempt steps out 
of bounds without threatening litigation or offering to settle. Fur-
thermore, the decision was not tailored to fit inside the  
Freyermuth and Huertas decisions; rather, the court specifically 
recognized that its decision created a circuit split, noting that “the 
statute cannot bear the reading that [the Freyermuth and  
Huertas] courts have given it.”103 
The benefit of the McMahon-style misrepresentation stand-
ard lies primarily in its flexibility. A more malleable and fact- 
sensitive standard than the threat-of-litigation test, the McMahon 
standard enables judges to better police the substance of debt col-
lectors’ tactics—rather than relying solely on the form of their lan-
guage. By expanding the FDCPA’s prohibitions to subtler, more 
implicit “threats” of litigation, the McMahon standard affords 
greater protection to the “least sophisticated consumer” who could 
 
 98 McMahon, 744 F3d at 1015. 
 99 See id at 1015. 
 100 Id at 1020. 
 101 Id (emphasis added). 
 102 McMahon, 744 F3d at 1022. 
 103 Id at 1020. 
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easily succumb to threats to sue and offers to settle with similar 
frequency. 
Just as the misrepresentation standard addresses the defi-
ciencies of the threat-of-litigation test, however, the McMahon 
standard introduces problems of its own. The circuits that have 
embraced the standard have uniformly declined to establish a per 
se rule that offers to “settle” time-barred debts always violate the 
FDCPA. Instead, they have only held that such an offer “could be” 
deceptive or misleading.104 Because of this limited holding, the 
McMahon misrepresentation standard remains vague in its ap-
plication. The exact circumstances that might convert an offer to 
settle into a misrepresentation of time-barred debt are left un-
clear. Moreover, the circuit-level courts have not identified any 
similarly deceptive alternatives to the term “settle.” As a result, 
the standard invites litigation to flesh out the outer bounds of 
permissible representations by debt collectors in the time-barred 
debt context, to determine the situations when using the word 
“settle” is appropriate, and to identify which alternatives to “set-
tle” do or do not constitute misrepresentation. Furthermore, be-
cause the question whether a collection letter is misleading is a 
question of fact,105 the whims of judges are likely to create diver-
gent standards, each one distinguishable from the next on some 
minor factual point. The predictability and efficiency of a bright-
line rule disappears with the introduction of McMahon’s pliable 
standard. 
C. Previous Attempts to Litigate Time-Barred Debt Collection 
under § 1692f 
Although the lion’s share of time-barred debt collection  
complaints has relied on allegations under § 1692e, litigants have 
frequently brought these claims under § 1692f’s prohibition on 
unfair or unconscionable collection practices. But the litigation of 
claims under § 1692f in this context has created an even more 
heterogeneous response than § 1692e litigation has. 
In Kimber, the earliest opinion on time-barred debts and the 
FDCPA, the district court addressed the unconscionability of ac-
tually filing suits on time-barred debts, but courts have rarely 
tested this proposition. Kimber implied that if a debt collector 
 
 104 Id at 1022. 
 105 See note 89. 
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filed suit on a time-barred claim, that suit would have automati-
cally constituted an unconscionable collection practice under 
§ 1692f.106 Although this proposition supports the argument that 
time-barred debt collection in general can trip the unconscionabil-
ity bar, it was drawn too narrowly to actually affect the majority of 
debt collection practices. Practically speaking, any time-barred 
debt collector that is actually deterred by the threat of liability  
under Kimber could simply seek revival of the debt first—through 
whatever “acknowledgment” procedures state law allows—before 
attempting to litigate the claim. Moreover, the implicit threat of 
litigation is often sufficient to induce payment. Under the current 
state of the law, debt collectors have ample opportunities to imply 
the viability of a claim without actually bringing it to court. 
Though Kimber offers some glimmer of hope to consumer- 
litigants, a more troubling trend is apparent in the majority of the 
§ 1692f cases addressing time-barred debt collection. Specifically, 
courts have tended to either summarily dismiss citations to 
§ 1692f or, more troubling still, misconstrue § 1692f as particu-
larly narrow when a claim has already failed under § 1692e.107 
Despite the general consensus that “the prefatory language [of 
§ 1692f] provides a cause of action,”108 the Fourth Circuit implied 
in Mavilla v Absolute Collection Service, Inc109 that a violation of 
some other provision of the FDCPA is prerequisite to finding a 
violation of § 1692f. After ruling against a consumer appellant on 
the § 1692e claim, the court noted that “[a]ppellants have not pre-
sented any evidence that [appellee’s] debt collection methods 
were illegal, and they do not argue that [appellee’s] collection ac-
tivities were harassing.”110 The first part of the court’s statement 
 
 106 See Kimber, 668 F Supp at 1487 (stating that “a debt collector’s filing of a lawsuit 
on a debt that appears to be time-barred . . . is an unfair and unconscionable means of 
collecting the debt”). 
 107 This phenomenon is arguably unique to the time-barred debt collection context. 
For example, in the context of “unfair” and/or “deceptive” tactics, courts have made clear 
that § 1692f provides a cause of action independent of § 1692e. That is, “a collection prac-
tice could be unfair without necessarily being deceptive.” See Currier v First Resolution 
Investment Corp, 762 F3d 529, 534 (6th Cir 2014). Thus, this Comment does not hesitate 
to define time-barred debt collection as unconscionable, even though it may not rise to the 
level of a misrepresentation. There is also little issue with classifying a practice as  
unconscionable even though it might similarly fail a § 1692e misrepresentation analysis be-
cause the statutory provisions are not “mutually exclusive” and “share the goal of protecting 
consumers from abuse by debt collectors.” See Arias v Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt 
LLP, 875 F3d 128, 135–36 (2d Cir 2017). 
 108 Tsenes, 892 F Supp at 466. 
 109 539 Fed Appx 202 (4th Cir 2013). 
 110 Mavilla, 539 Fed Appx at 207. 
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begs the question: surely Congress did not pass § 1692f in order 
to proscribe conduct that was already illegal. The court’s second 
proposition erred further by conflating § 1692f with a ban on “har-
assing” conduct—even though harassing conduct is expressly 
banned by a separate provision of the FDCPA.111 While the  
Mavilla court’s decision erred in rendering § 1692f essentially 
toothless, its worse fault—a fault apparent in similar decisions—
is the failure to adequately discuss time-barred debt collection un-
der § 1692f. 
It is difficult to determine from a short federal court decision 
the exact reason why courts have given such little discussion to 
§ 1692f claims in the context of time-barred debt collection. In-
deed, the Mavilla case implies a lack of evidence offered for the 
claim.112 Litigants may indeed have sunk their own § 1692f claims 
if they merely tacked them onto briefs without providing any  
justification as to why the § 1692f claim exists separate from the 
better-argued § 1692e claim. On the other hand, courts them-
selves may have reinforced the short shrift that litigants give to 
their § 1692f arguments. With a history of unceremoniously los-
ing on summary judgment and appeal, plaintiffs’ attorneys may 
have rationally decided to minimize the amount of brief space de-
voted to a statutory claim destined to lose. What these prior 
claims teach us, however, is that courts have rarely dealt with the 
unconscionability of time-barred debt collection critically, or have 
done so only in obviously inaccurate ways. The room to develop a 
§ 1692f claim in this context remains capacious, as the following 
Part will demonstrate. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF TIME-BARRED DEBT COLLECTION UNDER 
§ 1692f 
This Comment proposes a new and thus-far overlooked 
method for courts to tackle the problem of time-barred debt  
collection. Specifically, this Part presents the theoretical and nor-
mative justifications for an outright ban on attempts to collect 
time-barred debts as “unfair or unconscionable” under § 1692f of 
the FDCPA. As I explain in Part III.A below, attempts to collect 
time-barred debt when there is a threat of resetting the statute of 
 
 111 See 15 USC § 1692d. 
 112 See, for example, Mavilla, 539 Fed Appx at 207 (“Appellants do not specify which 
prohibited activities [appellee] engaged in, but appear to contend that [appellee’s] conduct 
generally violated the provision.”) (emphasis added). 
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limitations theoretically fit the definition of an “unfair or uncon-
scionable” practice as understood in three areas: (1) as previously 
defined by the federal courts, 113 (2) as within the intent of Congress 
in passing the FDCPA,114 and (3) as defined in an analogous area of 
law: the common law doctrine of contractual unconscionability.115 
Part III.B explains that normatively, an outright ban on time-barred 
debt collection will reduce the costs and likelihood of litigation by 
increasing uniformity and predictability in contrast to the malleable 
standards used by the McMahon-style courts.116 Additionally, the 
resolution of time-barred debts under § 1692f will allow the courts 
of appeals to sidestep the messy problem of overturning their respec-
tive interpretations of § 1692e to resolve the current circuit split.117 
A. The Theoretical Justification for Barring the Collection of 
Time-Barred Debts under § 1692f 
Unfortunately for courts and commentators, the FDCPA does 
not define the terms “unfair” or “unconscionable” anywhere in the 
statute. The best the drafters could provide is a non-exhaustive 
list of examples of such behavior.118 Before asserting that time-
barred debt collection falls within the purview of § 1692f, 
Part III.A provides some substance to the terms “unfair or uncon-
scionable.” The following sections seek to define the terms on 
three separate bases: (1) judicial interpretation of the FDCPA, 
(2) legislative intent of the FDCPA drafters, and (3) analogy to 
the use of “unconscionable” in the common law of contracts. After 
fleshing out these definitions, each section argues that the collec-
tion of time-barred debts satisfies the definition of an unconscion-
able act under any definition courts choose to accept. 
1. Judicial definitions of “unfair or unconscionable.” 
The two core components of § 1692f, unfair and unconsciona-
ble, elude a concrete definition when divorced from legislative and 
judicial interpretation. Dictionary definitions evoke some bad act 
that would shock the conscience. Black’s Law Dictionary lacks a 
standalone definition for “unfair,” but defines “unconscionable” as 
“showing no regard for conscience; affronting the sense of justice, 
 
 113 See Part III.A.1. 
 114 See Part III.A.2. 
 115 See Part III.A.3. 
 116 See Part III.B. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See 15 USC § 1692f(1)–(8). 
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decency, or reasonableness.”119 Merriam-Webster provides that 
“unfair” means “marked by injustice, impartiality, or deception: 
unjust; not equitable in business dealings” and “unconscionable” 
means “shockingly unfair or unjust; excessive, unreasonable.”120 
Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “unfair” as “not 
based on or behaving according to the principles of equality and 
justice” and “unconscionable” as “not right or reasonable.”121 
These dictionary definitions—which often serve as the starting 
point for judicial interpretations of statutory language122—imply 
a legislative intent to prohibit acts that threaten the principles of 
“good conscience,” “justice,” “decency,” “equity,” or “reason.” Un-
fortunately, these words are as nebulous and malleable as they 
come. Some might even argue that consumers, by refusing to pay 
debts and then seeking shelter in the statute of limitations, have 
acted as unconscionably as any debt collector seeking repayment 
of a legally valid debt. For this reason, it is important to turn to 
some examples of unconscionability offered by the FDCPA and 
related jurisprudence. 
Along with its ban on unfair or unconscionable practices, the 
FDCPA includes a nonexhaustive list of prohibited acts. At first 
glance, it appears this list is merely a motley group of examples: 
the solicitation of postdated checks for the purpose of threatening 
criminal prosecution; depositing or threatening to deposit post-
dated checks prior to the date on such checks; causing charges to 
be made for communications by concealment of the true purpose 
of the communication (as in the case of collect phone calls); com-
municating regarding a debt via postcard; using any symbol or 
verbiage other than the debt collector’s address when communi-
cating regarding a debt via mail; or threatening to take a nonju-
dicial repossession action when such action is not permitted by 
 
 119 Black’s Law Dictionary 1757 (West 10th ed 2014). 
 120 Unfair (Merriam-Webster, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/XZN7-KCEL; Un-
conscionable (Merriam-Webster, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/A6CV-7ES8. 
 121 Unfair (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/8MRS 
-Z4CJ; Unconscionable (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AL3U-BFUU. 
 122 See, for example, Smith v United States, 508 US 223, 228–31 (1993) (relying upon 
dictionary definitions of “use” to conclude that a statute prohibiting “use” of a firearm 
during a drug transaction covered bartering with a firearm for drugs). See also Rickie 
Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 Fordham L Rev 2177, 2192 (2003) 
(“[T]he degree of the Court’s reliance on dictionaries has also increased, developing from 
a method of identifying possible meanings of a word into the primary factor in determining 
the outcome of cases.”) (emphasis added). 
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law.123 Although some of these examples reflect the outdatedness 
of the statutory language, they nonetheless provide a coherent 
theme for courts to follow in assessing unconscionability. On the 
one hand, the FDCPA generally condones acts that seek to induce 
repayment by giving benefits to the consumer (such as a promise 
to reduce the amount a consumer owes on a non-time-barred debt) 
or threats to take legally enforceable action (such as a threat to 
bring suit on a non-time-barred debt or report the debt to a credit 
reporting agency). The FDCPA even permits general persuasive 
tactics, such as appeals to the morality of repaying a debt. On the 
other hand, each of the practices § 1692f expressly prohibits tends 
to penalize consumers through means beyond mere persuasion. 
This includes causing a consumer reputational harms (in the case 
of overly public communication) or inducing a consumer to act 
against their own interests by withholding information (in the 
case of soliciting postdated checks or misrepresenting collect 
calls). It is “tricks” of this kind that the FDCPA condemns. 
The practices to which courts have extended § 1692f’s blanket 
prohibition further reflect the FDCPA’s endorsement of persua-
sion over tricks. Practices that federal courts have held uncon-
scionable in the debt collection context include: sending materials 
that mimic the appearance of credit card statements;124 sending 
collections letters that shame and accuse the debtor of dishon-
esty;125 filing a garnishment suit against a consumer who is cur-
rent on payments;126 and charging huge fees when consumers at-
tempt to pay their debts.127 Essentially, each of these practices 
could make repayment of a debt more likely for the collector. The 
practices explicitly enumerated in § 1692f could also prove very 
effective in inducing debt repayment. These court decisions sug-
gest that the purpose of § 1692f is not banning practices that 
stray from the goal of debt collection (the repayment of debts). 
 
 123 See 15 USC § 1692f. By analogy to the provision against threatening unlawful re-
possession actions, it seems rather apparent that threatening to bring a collection suit 
that is not permitted by law due to the statute of limitations would also qualify as uncon-
scionable. Nevertheless, this Comment argues that any attempt to dun a time-barred debt, 
and not just a threat to file a suit on said debt, constitutes an unfair or unconscionable 
practice. This proposition requires justification beyond analogy to the explicitly listed 
practices in 15 USC § 1692f. 
 124 See Hartman v Great Seneca Financial Corp, 569 F3d 606, 610, 614 (6th Cir 2009). 
 125 See McMillan v Collection Professionals, Inc, 455 F3d 754, 765 (7th Cir 2006). 
 126 See Fox v Citicorp Credit Services, Inc, 15 F3d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir 1994). 
 127 See Bradley v Franklin Collection Services, 739 F3d 606, 610 (11th Cir 2014). 
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Rather, the purpose is to ban practices that stray from the legis-
latively endorsed methods of debt collection—positive induce-
ments and threats of legal enforcement. The practices targeted by 
courts under § 1692f’s catchall clause tend to stray from legisla-
tively endorsed collection practices into the realm of tricks and 
gimmicks. Far from reminding consumers of the facts of their 
debts, these practices obfuscate and may induce consumers into 
committing self-destructive action. 
Based upon the judicial interpretation of § 1692f’s scope, un-
conscionability under § 1692f would likely include any attempt to 
collect a time-barred debt that could easily be revived under rele-
vant state law. As long as the possibility of reviving the debt ex-
ists, the dunning of a time-barred debt will always fall outside of 
the debt collection tactics the FDCPA condones. With or without 
overt threats, time-barred debt collection can never successfully 
threaten a legally enforceable action before revival occurs (as no 
legally enforceable action exists after the statute of limitations 
expires). Furthermore, any “positive” inducement offered to a con-
sumer (such as a repayment plan or reduction of the debt) would 
not actually amount to a net positive: a “discount” would in fact 
make consumers worse off by reviving the enforceability of the 
underlying debt. If consumers do not accept the positive induce-
ment, they would not be obligated to repay the debt at all. Similar 
to the solicitation of postdated checks or the misrepresentation of 
collect calls, the pursuit of time-barred debts induces consumers 
to act against their own best interests without the benefit of in-
formation that the collectors exclusively hold. As no disclosure 
could adequately remedy this lack of consumer information,128 
time-barred debt collectors can never take advantage of informa-
tional asymmetries without transgressing the case law’s concep-
tion of unconscionable practices. 
 
 128 See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U Pa L Rev 647, 650–51 (2011) (arguing that the complexity of modern consumer 
transactions often means that mandated disclosure will inevitably fail to accomplish any 
meaningful purpose). But see Sukert, Note, 30 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 1028 (cited 
in note 40) (arguing that “[t]he CFPB’s proposed disclosure of a list of facts about a con-
sumer’s past debt manages to survive all of the criticisms of Ben-Shahar and Schneider,” 
but acknowledging that “the disclosure of the rules of time-barred debt and how those 
apply to a given consumer would likely fall victim to Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s . . .  
cautions”). 
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2. The legislative meaning of “unfair or unconscionable.” 
In determining how far the prohibition on unfair or uncon-
scionable practices should extend, this Comment naturally also 
considers how the drafters of the FDCPA expected the prohibition 
to operate. The legislative history suggests that Congress sought 
to advance a broad goal of consumer protection in passing the 
FDCPA. For instance, Representative Thomas B. Evans Jr noted 
in his remarks on the bill that “[e]very piece of legislation should 
have an objective or goal in mind,” and the goal of the FDCPA is 
“to prevent the unfair and unreasonable and, in many cases, un-
conscionable debt collection practices that some debt collection 
agencies employ.”129 Representative Evans’s conception of the 
FDCPA as a goal-oriented piece of legislation, rather than merely 
a sum of its constituent prohibitions, reflects an understanding of 
the law adopted by many federal courts. For example, the court 
in Hamilton v United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc130 concluded 
that Congress “clearly intended the FDCPA to have a broad re-
medial scope” given the Act’s legislative history.131 This declara-
tion of the FDCPA’s purpose and scope would go on to be cited by 
numerous courts thereafter.132 
Even if courts safely conclude that the statute indeed has con-
sumer protection as a broad policy goal, they must still consider 
the powers embodied in the Act’s text before endowing it with 
powers Congress did not intend. Specifically, some courts have 
taken issue with the statute’s supposedly “broad remedial 
scope.”133 While acknowledging the legislative goals of consumer 
protection, these courts have refused to endorse the mechanisms 
of § 1692f as a limitless means of implementing those goals.134 
Summarizing these contentions, the Seventh Circuit character-
ized the prefatory language of § 1692f as “as vague as they come,” 
 
 129 HR 5294, 95th Cong, 1st Sess, in 123 Cong Rec 10247 (Apr 4, 1977) (statement of 
Rep Evans). 
 130 310 F3d 385 (5th Cir 2002). 
 131 Hamilton, 310 F3d at 392. See also Johnson v Riddle, 305 F3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir 
2002) (noting that the FDCPA should ‘‘be construed liberally in favor of the consumer”). 
 132 See, for example, Serna v Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, PC, 732 F3d 440, 445 
(5th Cir 2013); Carter v First National Collection Bureau, Inc, 135 F Supp 3d 565, 569 (SD 
Tex 2015). 
 133 Serna, 732 F3d at 445 (emphasis omitted); Hamilton, 310 F3d at 392. 
 134 See, for example, Bentrud v Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, PC, 794 F3d 871, 
875 (7th Cir 2015) (noting that § 1692f is “not an enforcement mechanism for matters 
governed elsewhere by state and federal law”); Beler v Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & 
Moore, LCC, 480 F3d 470, 474 (7th Cir 2007). 
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arguing that enforcement mechanisms should be “adopted (if at 
all) through the administrative process or a statutory amendment 
rather than judicial definition of the phrase ‘unfair and uncon-
scionable.’”135 This Comment agrees with the Seventh Circuit that 
the three-word phrase at the heart of § 1692f is “vague.” But Con-
gress deliberately intended this vagueness to craft an adequate 
catchall.136 Legislators themselves recognized their inability to 
predict every single abusive practice that debt collectors would 
invent following the passage of the FDCPA. Although members of 
Congress did not provide a definition of the terms in the phrase 
“unfair or unconscionable” anywhere in the legislative history, 
this comports with the expectation that courts could more effec-
tively fill in the gaps. Whether fair or not, the FDCPA’s catchalls 
are intended to shift the burden of determining bad acts to the 
courts.137 
Of course, this Comment’s principal argument is that the 
phrase “unfair or unconscionable” in § 1692f should not be con-
strued narrowly or as some overbroad policy declaration, as some 
courts and commentators have argued.138 It remains true that 
Congress did not provide a clear definition of the term, either in 
the language of the statute or in the debate over the FDCPA’s 
fate. While we may conclude that Congress intended “unfair or 
unconscionable” to have the broadest definition possible given the 
statute’s “broad remedial scope,” the dictionaries’ broad defini-
tions remain frustratingly vague.139 The following Section argues 
that Congress’s intent may be satisfied through an inquiry into 
another area of the law with equally broad but much more de-
tailed definitions of unconscionability: the law of contracts. 
3. The meaning of unconscionability in the law of contracts. 
A longstanding canon of statutory interpretation suggests 
that legislatures legislate against the backdrop of the common 
law.140 That is, when terms of art from the common law creep into 
 
 135 Beler, 480 F3d at 474. 
 136 See note 63 and accompanying text. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 139 See notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 140 See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 
(1991) (reiterating the presumption that “Congress is understood to legislate against a 
background of common-law adjudicatory principles”). 
1968 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1941 
 
statutory law, there exists a presumption that the enacting legis-
lature intended to adopt the common law meaning when enacting 
the statute.141 The term “unfair” may be too vague to import any 
meaning from the common law, but the same cannot be said for 
the relatively obscure term “unconscionable.” The doctrine of  
unconscionability features most prominently in the common law 
of contracts.142 As this Section illustrates, there is good reason to 
suggest that “unconscionability” in the FDCPA embodies the 
meaning of the term at common law, and such an embodiment 
allows the FDCPA to condemn the practice of time-barred debt 
collection and the resurrection of consumer debts. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a generally 
applicable understanding of unconscionability doctrine, even 
though contract law varies across state jurisdictions. Starting 
from the broad scope of the Restatement, it is generally accepted 
that courts may render contracts or specific contract terms unen-
forceable when they are found to be “unconscionable.”143 Perhaps 
conscious of the fluidity of the term, the Restatement does not 
offer a clear-cut definition of what constitutes unconscionability. 
Nevertheless, the comments to § 208 do give some guidance as to 
when courts should find unconscionability in a contract or con-
tract term. Comment a says that a determination of unconscion-
ability is made “in light of [a contract or term’s] setting, purpose, 
and effect.”144 The inclusion of effect as a determinative factor re-
flects the FDCPA’s overall focus on the effect of debt collection 
practices to determine their validity.145 At the same time, the in-
clusion of purpose as an equally determinative factor preserves 
 
 141 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v Bureau of Land Management, 425 F3d 
735, 763 (10th Cir 2005) (“When Congress legislates against a backdrop of common law, 
without any indication of intention to depart from or change common law rules, the stat-
utory terms must be read as embodying their common law meaning.”) (emphasis added), 
citing Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co v Darden, 503 US 318, 322 (1992). 
 142 See Asifa Quraishi, From a Gasp to a Gamble: A Proposed Test for Unconsciona-
bility, 25 UC Davis L Rev 187, 188–89 (1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis added):  
The common law concept of unconscionability first appeared in the common-law 
courts of equity, and their refusal to enforce oppressive and harsh bargains. As 
the common law developed, this goal of preventing oppressive bargains eventu-
ally appeared in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which 
formalized the doctrine of unconscionability and applied it to all contract law. 
 143 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981). 
 144 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt a (1981) (emphasis added). 
 145 See Arias, 875 F3d at 138 & n 5 (incorporating some intent analysis by holding 
that, while the FDCPA remains a “strict liability” statute, bad faith may convert an oth-
erwise legal act to an “unfair or unconscionable” one). 
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some intent analysis “to insure [sic] that those debt collectors who 
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not com-
petitively disadvantaged.”146 The comments to § 208 also pre-
scribe an analysis of “weaknesses in the contracting process,” in-
cluding “contractual [in]capacity [and] fraud.”147 These procedural 
deficiencies in the contract process occur when a “transaction in-
volved elements of deception or compulsion, or [when] the weaker 
party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in 
fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.”148 Importantly 
for the analysis here, unconscionability doctrine also “overlaps 
with rules which render particular bargains or terms unenforce-
able on grounds of public policy.”149 Together, these provisions 
comprise the doctrine of “procedural unconscionability.” 
Besides simply proscribing terms against public policy and 
terms obtained via unconscionable procedures, the Restatement 
provides a key piece of circumstantial evidence for courts to use 
in identifying substantive, rather than procedural, unconsciona-
bility: inadequacy of consideration. While cautioning that inade-
quacy of consideration does not alone “invalidate a bargain,” Com-
ment c explains that “gross disparity in the values exchanged 
may be an important factor in a determination that a contract is 
unconscionable.”150 That is, when the value that one contracting 
party obtains greatly exceeds the value obtained by the other, 
courts may infer the presence of the underlying indicators of un-
conscionability. Examples of such indicators include procedural 
ills of unequal bargaining power, deception, or a lack of real al-
ternatives. Just as judges can identify procedural inequity in the 
presence of “gross inequality of bargaining power, together with 
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party,” a failure of 
consideration also acts as a heuristic in identifying substantively 
unconscionable contract terms.151 
In addition to the Restatement, the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC)—a body of law with wide applicability across the 
states152—provides a supplementary understanding of common 
 
 146 Arias, 875 F3d at 134. 
 147 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt a (1981). 
 148 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt d (1981). 
 149 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt a (1981). 
 150 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt c (1981). 
 151 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt d (1981). 
 152 See In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc, 401 Bankr 131, 134 (Bankr D Del 2009) 
(incorporating a UCC definition of “goods” into federal bankruptcy law “[g]iven the near 
unanimous nationwide adoption of Article 2 of the UCC”). 
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law unconscionability. Although the UCC generally finds more 
currency with commercial contracts153—and the concept of uncon-
scionability itself usually finds application only in the consumer 
context,154—commentary to § 2-302 of the UCC comprehensively 
summarizes the doctrine of unconscionability. It states: “The 
basic test [for unconscionability] is whether, in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as 
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time 
of the making of the contract.”155 When read in conjunction with 
the Restatement Comments, a finding of unconscionability re-
quires the presence of some combination of primary factors, in-
cluding procedural irregularity, unequal bargaining power, de-
ception, a lack of meaningful choice, inadequacy of consideration, 
or violation of public policy. No single factor is required or dispos-
itive, although each factor appears to some degree in the time-
barred debt collection context. 
The revival of time-barred debts, even without the presence 
of threats of litigation, satisfies the composite definition of uncon-
scionability at common law, as embodied in the Restatement and 
the UCC. Specifically, if a court interprets acknowledgment by a 
consumer as akin to a contractual agreement with the creditor, it 
violates the public policy of the FDCPA and statutes of limita-
tions, unfairly disadvantages consumers due to informational 
asymmetries and unequal bargaining power, and represents a 
failure of consideration by giving a windfall to debt collectors but 
essentially no benefit to consumers. 
As the Restatement indicates, there is substantial overlap be-
tween unconscionability and the determination that a contract or 
contract term violates public policy. In the time-barred debt col-
lection context, we are concerned with the public policies that un-
derlie the FDCPA as well as state statute of limitations laws. As 
the legislative history and judicial decisions suggest, Congress in-
tended the FDCPA to promote a broad policy of consumer protec-
tion against vexatious collection tactics. Given its propensity to 
“wreak havoc” on overburdened consumers, the law of reviving 
 
 153 See Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of 
the Common Law, 75 Wash U L Q 11, 14 (1997) (noting that “the [UCC] inherits the com-
mon law’s blindness to consumer concerns”). 
 154 See PC Com, Inc v Proteon, Inc, 946 F Supp 1125, 1138 (SDNY 1996) (noting that 
“[n]umerous cases have found that ‘the doctrine of unconscionability is not typically ap-
plied to commercial dealings between business entities’”). 
 155 UCC § 2-302, cmt 1 (2002). 
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debts is far from a pro-consumer policy.156 Any practice that seeks 
to take advantage of resetting the statute of limitations, then, is 
against the interests of consumers as a class. When the underly-
ing practice takes advantage of revival without consumers’ 
knowledge, as time-barred debt collection so often does, its con-
trast with the FDCPA’s goal of consumer protection stands out in 
even starker relief. 
Time-barred debt collection also contravenes the public policy 
behind statutes of limitations. These temporal bars to bringing 
suit have historically promoted the state policy of reducing the 
fear of litigation and ensuring that litigation is pursued at an ef-
ficient point in time. By withdrawing the legal remedies available 
to a potential creditor-plaintiff, the statute of limitations allows 
potential debtor-defendants to breathe easy after the period ex-
pires. A consumer with a time-barred debt no longer needs to look 
over her shoulder for the rest of her life, forever scanning the hori-
zon for the threat of litigation.157 The statute of limitations also 
compels plaintiffs to sue early, when evidence is still available to 
both parties.158 The collection of time-barred debts violates the 
statute of limitations’ public policy on both fronts. If collectors can 
pursue the debt indefinitely, then consumers may never stop 
glancing at the metaphorical rearview mirror. Moreover, uninten-
tional revival of debts by consumers encourages litigation well af-
ter both the consumer and the parties purchasing the consumer’s 
debt lose the supporting documentation that underlies the pur-
chased debt. 
The collection of time-barred debts implicates the unconscio-
nability doctrine of contract law beyond merely violating public pol-
icy; it also implicates procedural unconscionability in unfairly  
taking advantage of the informational asymmetries and unequal 
bargaining power that accompany the debtor–debt collector rela-
tionship. From the start, debt collectors have more resources 
available to press for payment than debtors have to resist that 
pressure. Organizational strength is pitted against individual 
strength. And yet, even were we to exclude the systematic  
 
 156 Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 328 (cited in note 8). 
 157 See United States v Kubrick, 444 US 111, 117 (1979) (noting that “[s]tatutes of 
limitations . . . represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put 
the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time”). 
 158 See id (“[Statutes of limitations] protect defendants and the courts from having to 
deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of 
evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappear-
ance of documents, or otherwise.”) (citations omitted). 
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advantage in bargaining power that debt collectors enjoy, con-
sumers are still disadvantaged by the debt collectors’ superior  
information. Debt collectors almost always have suspicions (if not 
outright knowledge) that the debts they seek to collect are stale. 
And in the rare cases when debt collectors lack the information 
necessary to support that suspicion, that same dearth of infor-
mation was factored into the lower price that the collector paid 
for the debt, on the assumption that it would be harder to col-
lect.159 On the other hand, consumers rarely have information on 
decades-old debts. They also importantly lack knowledge of the 
law of partial repayments and resetting the statute of limitations. 
Even when it is explained to them, the counterintuitive nature of 
statute of limitations law often escapes the “least sophisticated 
consumer’s” understanding.160 Without knowledge of how the ac-
knowledgment of time-barred debts affects their legal rights, 
debtors who enter into an agreement to acknowledge (and thus 
revive their debts) do “not in fact assent or appear to assent to the 
unfair terms.”161 
And what of the unfair terms central to showing substantive 
unconscionability? One could argue that the informational asym-
metry is immaterial as long as revival does not burden consumers 
with “unfair terms.” Here the heuristic of grossly inadequate con-
sideration comes into play. If the contractual interpretation of 
consumer debt revival is further extended, it becomes apparent 
that debt collectors enjoy a windfall without any reciprocal bene-
fit to the consumer. More precisely, when a consumer revives a 
debt, she is taking on a liability that she did not previously bear 
(because her debt had become unenforceable) without gaining an-
ything in return or placing any reciprocal liability on the debt col-
lector. Debt collectors in turn enjoy a practically new legal right 
 
 159 See Jimenez, 52 Harv J Legis at 43 (cited in note 30) (explaining that one of several 
factors affecting the price of the debt is the “information (or lack thereof) about the debt 
that the seller provides to the buyer”). 
 160 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Proposals under Consideration at *19 
(cited in note 43) (“Concepts related to statutes of limitations are challenging for consum-
ers to understand, especially the fact that in some jurisdictions consumers may ‘revive’ a 
debt and reset the statute of limitations by making a partial payment or acknowledging 
the debt in writing.”). 
 161 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, cmt d (1981). 
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without incurring any liability or obligation that they did not al-
ready bear.162 Under the common law of contracts, huge dispari-
ties in consideration received by the parties strongly suggest sub-
stantive unconscionability. In this context, the gap could not be 
larger, as consumers receive no new consideration whatsoever.163 
One could object to the analogy between the term “uncon-
scionable” in federal collections law and the doctrine of uncon-
scionability in state law as enjoying only a tenuous connection. 
However, the case law suggests that applying state law defini-
tions to federal common law principles is not an unprecedented 
move for courts to make.164 Superficially, the affirmative defense 
that unconscionability provides in contract law does appear unre-
lated to the right of action that the FDCPA provides to remedy 
unconscionability. Indeed, courts have consistently reiterated 
that § 1692f goes to the unconscionability of a collection tactic 
only, without reaching the enforceability of the underlying debt.165 
 
 162 See Marc C. McAllister, Ending Litigation and Financial Windfalls on Time-
Barred Debts, 75 Wash & Lee L Rev 449, 456 (2018) (noting that time-barred debt collec-
tion “result[s] in a financial windfall to the collector, who might otherwise be prevented 
from collecting any portion of the debt due to the statute of limitations”). This is especially 
problematic considering the fact that third-party debt buyers have paid well below par 
value for defaulted debts. See note 20 and accompanying text. The low-price debt buyers 
pay for these debts already accounted for their time-barred nature. Resetting the statute 
of limitations allows these debt collectors to recoup the surplus value created by the steep 
reduction in prices. 
 163 One could argue that the consideration that consumers receive is the clearing of 
their conscience, but this proposition fails to stand up to scrutiny. Consumers already had 
the right to clear their consciences by paying the time-barred debt before its statute of 
limitations was ever reset. 
 164 And in fact, this move by courts comports with the history of unconscionability. 
The idea of unconscionability as a narrow doctrine of contractual interpretation—which 
Congress simply could not have intended to import into the FDCPA—is further repudiated 
by the fact that unconscionability was not always exclusive to the law of contracts. Prior 
to its influential appearance in the UCC (which precipitated the modern perception of 
unconscionability as a rarely-used, rarely-successful, “contracts-only” doctrine), courts of 
equity employed unconscionability “to preserve estates and family relations, protect the 
‘weak,’ and prevent enforcement of grossly unfair or quasi-fraudulent exchanges.” Amy J. 
Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 Ala L Rev 73, 81 (2006). 
Indeed, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone described the “unconscientious use of legal rights” as 
the basis for “practically the whole content of the law of equity.” Book Reviews, 12 Colum 
L Rev 757, 757 (1912). For more information on the historical role of unconscionability 
prior to the UCC, see Schmitz, 58 Ala L Rev at 76–90. See also Gordon v Rosenblum, 393 
P3d 1122, 1128 (Or 2017) (“Although today the doctrine [of unconscionability] appears 
most often in contract law, historically the doctrine has been applied in many areas of law 
where courts sought to avoid what they perceived as unfair outcomes.”). 
 165 See Babadjanian v Deutsche Bank National Trust Co, 2011 WL 13214300, *11 (CD 
Cal), citing Azar v Hayter, 874 F Supp 1314, 1317 (ND Fla 1995) (“Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim 
has nothing to do with whether the underlying debt is valid. An FDCPA claim concerns 
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Conversely, attempts to collect debts founded on unconscionable 
contracts do not automatically trip § 1692f absent some unfair 
collection tactic.166 Nevertheless, the court in Adams v Law Offices 
of Stuckert & Yates167 specifically vested § 1692f with a state-law 
definition of unconscionability, describing unconscionability as 
“patent unfairness,” signaled by the “hallmark” of “abuse of [the 
debt collector’s] superior economic position and level of sophisti-
cation.”168 A bankruptcy court, building on the Adams decision, 
faulted a tactic very similar to the revival of time-barred debts as 
violating § 1692f. The court noted that a debt collector, “with its 
numerous employees and lawyers, used its superior economic re-
sources and knowledge of the law to induce . . . an unsophisticated 
consumer, to give up his legal rights by signing the Proposed Con-
sent Judgment.”169 Thus, while no court has found the collection 
of time-barred debt to automatically violate § 1692f, as this Com-
ment suggests they should, courts have already begun connecting 
“unconscionable” in the FDCPA to unconscionability doctrine in 
the common law of contracts.170 
In addition to these judicial maneuvers, state legislatures 
have enacted their own consumer protection laws that mirror 
§ 1692f’s ban on unconscionable practices while simultaneously 
embracing the definition of unconscionability from contract law. 
For example, the New Mexico Unfair Practice Act171 (“New Mexico 
UPA”) prohibits “unconscionable trade practices,” which are de-
fined as practices in connection with the “collection of debts that 
 
the method of collecting the debt.”). See also Rendon v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, 2009 
WL 3126400, *9 (ED Cal). 
 166 See Babadjanian, 2011 WL 13214300 at *12. 
 167 926 F Supp 521 (ED Pa 1996). 
 168 Id at 528, citing Peoples Mortgage Co, Inc v Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion, 856 F Supp 910, 927 (ED Pa 1994). Note that the district court case from which  
Adams obtains its definition of unconscionability was a diversity case interpreting the 
state common law of Pennsylvania. Adams’s conception of unconscionability under § 1692f 
has gone on to be cited approvingly by at least three other federal district courts and one 
federal bankruptcy court. See Sullivan v Credit Control Servs, Inc, 745 F Supp 2d 2, 13 (D 
Mass 2010); House v Bank United, 2002 WL 32496179, *2 (WDNY); Williams v Javitch, 
Block & Rathbone, LLP, 480 F Supp 2d 1016, 1023 (SD Ohio 2007); In re Humes, 496 
Bankr 557, 579 (Bankr ED Ark 2013). While no circuit-level court has explicitly endorsed 
the Adams court’s definition of unconscionability as rooted in state contract law, neither 
has any rejected it, and the Seventh Circuit is at least aware that such a judicial definition 
exists. See McMillan, 455 F3d at 765 n 15. 
 169 In re Humes, 496 Bankr at 579. 
 170 This is not to suggest that contract law unconscionability is the only way to under-
stand § 1692f. It is merely a compelling way to do so, in light of the facts of time-barred 
debt revival and the past conduct of federal courts. 
 171 NM Stat Ann § 57-12-1 et seq. 
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to a person’s detriment: (1) take[ ] advantage of the lack of 
knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of a person to a grossly 
unfair degree; or (2) result[ ] in a gross disparity between the 
value received by a person and the price paid.”172 Guam has an 
almost identical rule,173 Texas has a rule that prohibits practices 
described in item (1) of the New Mexico UPA,174 and Wisconsin has 
an even broader rule, prohibiting the same conduct as the New 
Mexico UPA as well as seven other definitions of unconscionable 
acts.175 Although these statutes, passed by wholly separate legis-
latures, far from conclusively establish Congress’ intent behind 
the word “unconscionable” in § 1692f, they show that it is possible 
for legislatures to transplant a definition rooted in contract law 
to the realm of debt collection practices. Given that the revival of 
debts via acknowledgment resembles the creation of a bargain in 
many respects—including the written proof of consent and the ac-
ceptance of a new obligation by the debtor176—the argument that 
debt collection is too different from contract formation to support 
this Comment’s analogy fails to hold much water. 
B. The Normative Justification for Barring the Collection of 
Time-Barred Debts under § 1692f 
Courts have upheld time-barred debt collection—in princi-
ple—since at least the passage of the FDCPA. Therefore, a  
consequentialist-minded jurist would likely seek greater justifi-
cation beyond a mere definitional analysis of an admittedly vague 
statute before outlawing the practice. Indeed, the expansive use 
of § 1692f to prohibit all time-barred debt collection attempts, as 
outlined above, would partially contravene the underlying law of 
the forty-eight states that allow the revival of time-barred debts177 
and very likely burden the economically significant time-barred 
debt collection industry.178 With the entire industry of time-
barred debt collection at stake, it is crucial to establish the nor-
mative desirability of this Comment’s proposed solution before 
implementing it. This Section argues that the normative benefits 
 
 172 NM Stat Ann § 57-12-2. 
 173 See 5 Guam Code Ann § 32103(q). 
 174 See Tex Bus & Com Code Ann § 17.45(5). 
 175 See Wis Stat § 425.107(3). 
 176 See Part I.A. 
 177 See notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 178 See Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 336 (cited in note 8) (noting that “[t]he industry is 
expected to exceed $500 billion in collections and create more than a million jobs in the 
United States over the next ten years”). 
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of administrability, predictability, and uniformity implicated by 
a prohibition on time-barred debt collection will outweigh the bur-
dens that it may impose on the debt collection industry. 
This Comment’s approach does not require any legislative or 
administrative action. Unlike the approaches that many scholars 
have suggested, this Comment’s proposed solution to the problem 
of time-barred debt collection does not require a new statute, a 
statutory amendment, or an administrative action. The compet-
ing solution proposed by many courts and commentators—the 
mandatory inclusion of greater disclosures in letters that dun 
time-barred debts—requires additional regulation by the FTC or 
CFPB or piecemeal judicial fiats. Even if we were to make the 
very arguable assumptions that disclosures would be effective 
and that courts could impose disclosures independent of adminis-
trative action, we would have to trust that each circuit would craft 
the same or substantially similar disclosures to ensure uni-
formity. This hope is a bridge too far. Courts are unlikely to con-
verge around a single scripted disclosure; the possibility that 
courts can agree on an interpretation that requires a mere yes or 
no (that is, “Is time-barred debt collection unconscionable, yes or 
no?”) is far more likely. 
Beyond the prospect of implementing this solution without 
legislative or administrative action, courts are particularly likely 
to implement this Comment’s solution because it invites judge-
made law into a relatively uncluttered domain. Because so few 
district courts and no circuit courts have critically evaluated the 
applicability of § 1692f to time-barred debt collection,179 a new ap-
proach under that statutory provision will not require courts to 
overturn their own precedents. Moreover, because courts can em-
brace this Comment’s analysis without overturning any prece-
dent, we may expect acceptance from both the courts that use the 
threat-of-litigation test as well as those that use the misrepresen-
tation standard under § 1692e. Given the Supreme Court’s dis-
cretionary docket, a circuit-by-circuit approach may solve this 
problem sooner rather than later.180 
 
 179 See Part II.C. 
 180 This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court would never accept the solution 
proposed by this Comment. In fact, two ideologically disparate judges—Justices Samuel 
Alito and Sonia Sotomayor—have already expressed dissatisfaction and condemnation of 
the time-barred debt collection industry. See Oral Argument, Midland Funding, LLC v 
Johnson, No 16-348 at *5–6, *41–42 (US argued Jan 17, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 
2017 WL 169264). 
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Even though this approach may seem relatively simple to im-
plement, the question remains why a judge would seek to alter 
the state of the law at all. The status quo of continuing to adjudi-
cate time-barred debt collection under § 1692e would indeed be 
the simplest resolution of this issue. Even accepting the arguable 
proposition that the circuit split alone does not provide justifica-
tion for a new approach, this Comment’s proposal also addresses 
the problems presented by both current judicial approaches under 
§ 1692e.181 As a blanket prohibition on time-barred debt collection 
in those states where reviving time-barred debts is possible, clas-
sifying time-barred debts as unconscionable under § 1692f offers 
consumers far greater protections with a far sounder statutory 
basis than Freyermuth’s threat-of-litigation test.182 Additionally, 
this blanket ban preserves the benefits of predictability and effi-
ciency that Freyermuth’s test embraced. Unlike the misrepresen-
tation standard,183 an unconscionability approach addresses time-
barred debt collection as per se forbidden, thus eliminating the 
need for courts to engage in messy disputes over verbiage and the 
impact it has on an “objective” consumer. A bright-line rule will 
create more predictability and reduce the costs of litigation; it will 
also remove the incentive that debt collectors have under the mis-
representation standard to push the boundaries of acceptable 
practices. 
Concomitant with the benefit of keeping courts out of diction-
ary disputes is the uniformity that this approach will bring to fed-
eral jurisprudence. When it comes to consumer protection, uni-
form application of the law is desirable.184 Uniformity also 
comports with the express purposes of the FDCPA “to promote 
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collec-
tion abuses.”185 Under the competing misrepresentation standard 
of § 1692e, courts are not given any sample language that would 
per se violate the statute’s ban on misrepresentation. Thus, even 
words like “settle” can be approved by some courts and not others. 
Splits can occur within the circuits themselves, not to mention 
among the circuits, depending on the granular facts of each case. 
 
 181 See Parts II.A and II.B. 
 182 See Part II.A. 
 183 See Part II.B. 
 184 See McAllister, 75 Wash & Lee L Rev at 491 (cited in note 162) (arguing that 
“[u]pon examining the current landscape with respect to time-barred debts, it becomes 
clear that greater uniformity of legal principles and judicial practices is needed to ensure 
that like debtors are treated alike”). 
 185 15 USC § 1692(e) (emphasis added). 
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Discontinuity disadvantages consumers and even burdens debt 
collectors, who may take more or less cautious approaches in dun-
ning letters depending on the circuit in which a consumer resides. 
Under the approach suggested by this Comment, the only differ-
ence across jurisdictions that will impact the validity of time-
barred debt collection is whether they allow the revival of debt 
under state law. Because resetting the statute of limitations pre-
sents the greatest and possibly only easily calculable harm to con-
sumers in the time-barred debt context, its existence as a distin-
guishing factor in the law makes sense. 
CONCLUSION 
The threat of revenant debts under state statutes of limita-
tions undeniably causes the collection of time-barred debts, in any 
form, to wreak havoc on unsuspecting consumers. The current so-
lutions to time-barred debt collection under § 1692e’s prohibition 
on misrepresentation provide inadequate protection to consumers 
and mire courts in the fraught process of classifying dunning let-
ters. Courts’ current obligation to divine when an errant word in 
a dunning letter “goes too far” creates an environment ripe for 
litigation and boundary-pushing by unscrupulous debt collectors. 
Luckily for consumers, the FDCPA provides an escape hatch for 
courts who may wish to extend consumer protections further, con-
sonant with the law’s “broad remedial scope,” without revising 
their own battle-hardened precedents. Section 1692f’s ban on “un-
fair or unconscionable” practices provides a well-founded basis for 
outlawing time-barred debt collection. Theoretically, attempts to 
collect time-barred debts given the possibility of revival that is 
unknown to consumers constitutes an unconscionable practice 
under the precedent of federal decisions and through analogy to 
common law unconscionability. Normatively, a blanket ban on 
such a practice under § 1692f will provide much greater predicta-
bility to potential litigants, increase uniformity of decisions across 
the courts of appeals, and hopefully reduce the likelihood of liti-
gating this issue. 
It seems clear that a blanket prohibition will benefit consum-
ers. The statute of limitations will serve the purpose once again 
of relieving consumers of the need to look over their shoulders. 
And we can be sure that any attempt to pay off time-barred debts 
truly originates from the sense of moral duty that courts so often 
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tout186—rather than from the probability nowadays that revival 
happens only after a consumer has been tricked into it. The big-
gest downside to such a comprehensive limitation on time-barred 
debt collection is the impact it will have on the trade of time-
barred debts.187 This is undeniable. Under this Comment’s pro-
posed solution, the time-barred debt industry will greatly suffer. 
The trade in debts may shrink or disappear completely when the 
debts’ statutes of limitations have passed. But when choosing be-
tween a unified debt collection industry and a hopelessly diverse 
and disorganized consumer base, we should assume that the debt 
collectors can better bear the risk of shifting their practices to 
comport with the law. Indeed, a change to the FDCPA jurispru-
dence may even incentivize debt collectors to improve their prac-
tices, such as trading in better information.188 But regardless of 
any positive changes that this Comment’s approach may motivate 
in debt collectors, courts must remain mindful that the purpose 
of the FDCPA is to protect consumers, first and foremost. In pass-
ing the Act, Congress authorized the sacrifices of debt collectors 
at the altar of consumer protection. The wisdom of such a unilat-
erally protective law is not for courts to pass judgment on. In-
stead, courts should give thorough and thoughtful consideration 
to litigants who challenge time-barred debt collection as “unfair 
or unconscionable,” and rule accordingly. Under this approach, 
the zombie debt plague may finally find a cure. 
 
 
 186 See, for example, Pantoja v Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 852 F3d 679, 685 (7th 
Cir 2017) (“The creditor retains the legal right to appeal to the debtor to honor the debt out 
of a sense of moral obligation even if the legal obligation can no longer be enforced in court.”); 
McMahon, 744 F3d at 1020 (“[S]ome people might consider full debt re-payment a moral 
obligation, even though the legal remedy for the debt has been extinguished.”). 
 187 One might imagine that reducing the trade in time-barred debts could spark an 
unintended reduction in the credit market for less creditworthy individuals, counteracting 
any pro-consumer effects. While every consequence of this Comment’s proposal cannot be 
completely divined and dismissed, I believe any potential constriction in the credit market 
would be negligible, as primary creditors already offload these debts at a huge loss—even 
with the existence of a secondhand consumer debt market—and yet continue to make 
credit available. Moreover, the primary credit markets operated without the benefit of a 
secondhand consumer debt market up until the early 1990s; the removal of only time-
barred debts from that market wouldn’t even return the credit markets to the pre-1990s 
status quo. See Sobol, 44 NM L Rev at 331 (cited in note 8). 
 188 For example, if the statute of limitations preemptively bars any attempt to collect 
a debt, collectors may be more motivated to know the time-barred status of a debt before 
purchasing it. Contrast with note 29 and accompanying text. 
